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Abstract: The work of the Centre for Legal Terminology in African Languages comprises the 
compilation of a legal dictionary where various legal terms are defined and translated into the 
different indigenous African languages. During the first phase of the Centre's work a selection is 
made of English terms in the domains of criminal law and criminal procedural law. These terms 
are then defined and translated into the first target language, namely Afrikaans. This article deals 
with the lexicographical and legal problems encountered by the Centre during this phase as seen 
from a lawyer's perspective. On the lexicographical side the problems relate to demarcating the 
domains, determining a target group, the availability or lack of sources and indicating how the 
Afrikaans translation helps in establishing the correct meanings of terms. The legal problems 
encountered relate mostly to copyright, but brief reference is also made to the aspect of civilliabil-
ity which might arise from the use of the completed dictionary. 
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Opsomming: Verdwaal in die doolhof van leksikografie - die stryd van In 
regsgeleerde. Die werk van die Sentrum vir Regsterminologie in Afrikatale behels die samestel-
ling van 'n regswoordeboek waarin verskillende regsterme gedefinieer en dan vertaal word in die 
verskillende inheemse Afrikatale. Gedurende die eerste fase van die Sentrum se werksaamhede 
word 'n keuse van Engelse terme op die terrein van strafreg en strafprosesreg gemaak. Hierdie 
terme word dan van definisies voorsien en in die eerste doeltaal, naamlik Afrikaans, vertaal. Hier-
die artikel handel oor die leksikografiese en regsprobleme wat deur die Sentrum ervaar is gedu-
rende hierdie fase van die werk, soos gesien vanuit 'n regsgeleerde se perspektief. Aan die leksiko-
grafiese kant hou die probleme verband met die afbakening van die terreine, die bepaling van 'n 
teikengroep, die beskikbaarheid of gebrek aan bronne asook 'n aanduiding van hoe die Afrikaanse 
vertaling meehelp om die korrekte betekenis van terme te bepaal. Regsprobleme wat ervaar is, hou 
grotendeels verband met outeursreg, maar daar word ook kortliks verwys na die aspek van siviele 
aanspreeklikheid wat mag voortvloei uit die gebruik van die voltooide woordeboek. 
Sleutelwoorde: DEFlNISlE, INHEEMSE AFRIKATALE, LEKSIKOGRAFIE, MISDAAD, 
OUTEURSREG, PRODUKTEAANSPREEKLIKHEID, REG, REGSAANSPREEKLIKHEID, REGS-
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TERM, REGSTERMINOLOGIE, SENTRUM VIR REGSTERMINOLOGIE IN AFRIKATALE, 
STRAFPROSESREG, STRAFREG, VERTALING, WOORDEBOEK 
1. Introduction 
In the late 1980s the idea arose to make legal terminology more accessible to the 
average South African citizen. At that stage nobody involved in the process 
realised what really lay ahead. The aim was somewhat idealistic: to compile a 
dictionary containing various legal terms with their definitions and at the same 
time to translate these terms and definitions into one or more of the various 
indigenous African languages. The Centre for Legal Terminology in African 
Languages was established to organise and co-ordinate the work. The back-
ground to the formation of the Centre, its objectives, working procedure and 
some of the original problems encountered, were related in an earlier edition of 
Lexikos and will not be repeated here. It is, however, necessary to refer briefly to 
the various stages in the working procedure as mentioned by Alberts (1997: 
184). 
The first phase comprised the compilation of lists of legal terms in English 
in the domains of criminal law and criminal procedural law. Definitions were 
then provided for terms with a specific legal meaning and, where necessary, 
examples of how the terms should or could be used, were given. The English 
terms, their definitions and examples were then translated into Afrikaans. 
During the second phase the English-Afrikaans term list was edited to 
conform to terminological and terminographical standards, entered into a com-
puter and adapted in accordance with the requirements of the database system. 
The third phase involved the translation of the various terms and their 
definitions and examples into an indigenous African language. At present the 
Centre is working on Sepedi but the idea is to extend the work to other indige-
nous languages during the fourth and further phases of the work. 
Each phase in the work process has unique problems and pitfalls, requir-
ing caution by the researcher. In this article an attempt is made to examine the 
first phase of the work where terms are selected and defined in the source lan-
guage and simultaneously translated into Afrikaans, the first target language. 
During this phase law and lexicography inevitably overlap. For the sake of 
convenience, however, this article will first deal with the problems that are of a 
more lexicographical nature (as seen from a lawyer's perspective), and then 
refer briefly to some problems also encountered in the legal field. The informa-











































56 Marthie Jansen 
2. Problems of a Lexicographical Nature 
2.1 Selection of Legal Terms in the Source Language 
As stated by Alberts (1997: 183) "at this stage, the Centre for Legal Termmology 
in African Languages only concentrates on providing African language 
equivalents in the sub domains of criminal law and criminal procedural law 
because of the dire need in these legal fields". 
Although such a demarcation seems simple and straightforward enough, 
it provided the first obstacle to be overcome in the work of the Centre, namely 
determining the ambit of the fields of criminal law and criminal procedural 
law. In its most simplistic form criminal law can be described as that "branch of 
the law that specifies what conduct constitutes a crime and establishes appro-
priate punishment for such conduct" (Handler 1994: 119). Criminal procedural 
law then, according to Snyman (19953: 5), is "the procedure by which alleged 
criminals are brought before court and tried for their alleged offences". From 
these descriptions it is immediately evident that the concepts of "crime" and 
"offence" are crucial. For a layperson the terms are associated with bloodshed, 
murder, rape, robbery, theft, et cetera, as well as the accompanying gory de-
tails. 
From a lawyer's perspective the scene is somewhat different. A lawyer 
starts from the basic premise that the function of the law is to solve social con-
flicts and thereby to create order in a community (Hosten et al. 1977: 16). This is 
done by defining the interests of people, balancing them with those of others 
and harmonising them so that one person's interests does not encroach on 
another's. Whenever the legal equilibrium is disturbed, the legal system 
attempts to restore it by attaching enforceable consequences to the conduct that 
originally disturbed the harmony. This compulsory restoration of the disturbed 
legal position is called "retribution" and can take the form of punishment or of 
compensation for damages caused. Crimes are forms of conduct that are not 
only committed against the individual, but disturb the public order as well. 
Mere compensation of the injured individual does not provide adequate retri-
bution. The retribution provided has to satisfy the needs of the community. 
Punishment by the state as representative of the community is therefore the 
most appropriate solution to the disturbed legal position. At this stage it ought 
to be clear that from this perspective virtually any act has within itself the seed 
to develop into a crime. This means that the boundaries of the field of criminal 
law are virtually indeterminable. 
This is why one finds that sometimes a crime is defined in such a way that 
the definition seems all-encompassing, namely as "an act or omission which, 
whether or not it is morally wrongful or is deemed a wrong to an individual 
and civilly actionable by him for compensation from the harm done to him, is 
legally deemed an offence against the State or the community or the public and 
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order, peace and well-being and in the interest of society" (Walker 1980: 313). In 
nonlegal dictionaries,.such as Hanks (19892: 369), the definition stands out for 
its brevity: "an act or omission prohibited and punished by law". In practice 
lawyers apply a more conservative approach by retaining only those elements 
in the definition that are absolutely necessary. Thus a crime is generally 
defined as "an unlawful blameworthy human act or omission prohibited and 
punished by law". 
For the sake of those readers unfamiliar with the law, a brief explanation 
of the meaning of the various terms in this definition follows below. 
(1) Human act or omission 
From what has already been said, it is evident that the legal equilibrium can 
only be disturbed by some form of human conduct. A crime must therefore 
consist of an act. Mere thoughts or even decisions to commit a crime are not 
punishable (Snyman 19953: 26). The law does not limit the meaning of "act" to 
positive conduct only, but includes negative conduct as well. By negative con-
duct is understood the failure to act where a person is legally obliged to do 
something (Snyman 19953: 26) - in legal terminology known as an omission. A 
good example of this is the failure to stop at a red traffic light. 
(2) Prohibited or punished by law 
The requirement embodied in this phrase is called "the principle of legality". It 
has its origin in a well-known Latin maxim nullum crimen sine lege which means 
"without a law no crime can exist". According to this principle, a person will 
only be liable if his/her conduct was considered a crime by the legal system at 
the moment it took place. A person cannot be found guilty and punished by a 
court merely because the presiding judge is of the opinion that the particular 
conduct of which the person is accused, is immoral or damaging to the com-
munity or that the culprit "deserves" to be punished. A well-defined legal pro-
hibition must exist indicating exactly what type of conduct is not permissible. 
In short, this means that the man/woman in the street must be able to deter-
mine what is expected from him/her. 
This principle has certain serious consequences for the compilation of a 
legal dictionary, as will be explained below. At this stage it is important to note 
that we do not have a codified criminal law system in South Africa. This means 
that we do not have a specific written source listing each and every form of 
conduct that is regarded as a crime. 
To determine what constitutes criminal conduct in South Africa, one has 
to consult two sources, viz. common law and statutory law. Common-law 
crimes encompass those crimes that have existed within the community from 










































58 Marthie Jansen 
regarded as loathsome. They have no specific date of birth, nor can one ascribe 
their origin to a specific government. Everybody within a given community is 
normally aware of the fact that these forms of conduct are not acceptable. 
Common-law crimes therefore form part of our legal inheritance and legal tra-
dition. Examples would be crimes such as murder, theft, assault, rape, et cetera. 
Common-law crimes developed from the needs of the community. It is there-
fore logical that changing requirements can lead to changes in the definitions of 
these crimes in order to adapt them to altered circumstances. Such adaptation 
cannot however be done indiscriminately when the law is applied in court, as it 
would violate the principle of legality and members of the public would not 
know which forms of conduct should be avoided. An example illustrates this: 
theft has traditionally been defined as "the wrongful taking of any movable 
property without the consent of the owner, with the intention on the part of the 
taker to appropriate it" (Milne et al. 19513: 813). In terms of this definition one 
requirement was that the article stolen should be something that could be 
physically removed. Banknotes and coins comprise such articles and could 
therefore be stolen. Due to the development of technology and computer sys-
tems, it is nowadays possible to transfer credit from one bank account to 
another simply by altering various entries in the records. In principle the effect 
is precisely the same as if money had physically been removed from one per-
son's possession and handed to another. The legal system merely adapted the 
existing definition to include these forms of conduct under the definition of 
theft. Common-law crimes can therefore make provision for situations which 
are not yet known and a prospective criminal can be forestalled. The only prob-
lem from the viewpoint of a dictionary compiler is to state in words what the 
collective mind of the community understands the crime to be. This is why one 
finds that more recent definitions of common-law crimes are normally long and 
burdensome, as is evidenced by the latest definition of theft given by Snyman 
(19953: 445): 
"A person commits theft if he unlawfully and intentionally appropriates 
movable, corporeal property which 
(a) belongs to, and is in the possession of, another; 
(b) belongs to another but is in the perpetrator's own possession; or 
(c) belongs to the perpetrator but is in another's possession and such other 
person has a right to possess it which legally prevails against the perpetrator's 
own right of possession 
provided that the intention to appropriate the property includes an inten-' 
tion permanently to deprive the person entitled to the possession of the prop-
erty, of such property." 
Another problem with regard to the common law is that adaptations can-
not occur ad infinitum. Somewhere a line has to be drawn. If one extends the 
definition of theft to include theft of credit, would this imply that one could 
extend it even further to include an abstract concept such as the theft of elec-
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network? If certainty is also a requirement for a legal system to be successful, 
mere extensions cannot be regarded as the ultimate solution. Other arrange-
ments have to be made. 
It is here that the state enters into the picture in the guise of the legislature. 
As and when developments create the need for further forms of conduct to be 
declared crimes, the legislature merely determines this in an Act of Parliament. 
Because the new crime created in the Act is as yet unknown to the community, 
the wording of the Act must state precisely what is prohibited. An interpreter 
of the statute is limited in his or her interpretation by the wording of the Act. 
What is problematic about such a statutory definition is the fact that criminals 
are normally one step ahead of the law. As these new definitions have not yet 
stood the test of time, loopholes are usually easy to find, with the result that 
such definitions have to be amended time and again. Where the definition of 
such statutory crimes are incorporated in a dictionary, the precise wording, 
regardless of how comprehensive it may be, must be provided as well as refer-
ence to the specific statute where the definition appears. The compilers of the 
dictionary furthermore run the risk that such definitions may become outdated 
even before their work is published. A well-known example is the case relating 
to Communism. The South African Communist Party was declared an unlaw-
ful organisation in terms of section 4 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. 
Promoting the aims of this organisation was at that stage considered a punish-
able crime. Due to the change in political environment, the SACP was declared 
lawful and the bulk of the Internal Security Act was repealed because it no 
longer reflected the views of the ruling government. A definition which 
regards the promotion of the aims of Communism as a crime, would therefore 
be outdated. 
An interesting example encountered by the Centre whilst defining various 
crimes was the case of "bigamy". Traditionally bigamy has been regarded as a 
common-law crime in South Africa and was also punished as such, although 
exceptions were made for people married in terms of indigenous or customary 
law. The new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 had an 
impact on this view. Provision is made in the Constitution for the development 
and application of indigenous (customary) law alongside the existing common 
law (s 39(2)). It is also provided that there may not be any form of unfair dis-
crimination against individuals or groups of people on the ground of race, 
gender, et cetera (s 9). One can now argue that if one man in a country has the 
right to have more than one wife, whereas another man in the same country 
may have only one, this constitutes unfair discrimination. (I refrain from stat-
ing against whom the discrimination is exerted.) In this transitionary period 
how should one define bigamy in an explanatory dictionary? Is it "marrying 
more than one wife which is regarded as a crime by a certain section of the 
community", or is it "having more than one wife which is an acceptable practice 
for part of the community" or should one rather exclude all references to dis-










































60 Marthie Jartsen 
conduct (depending on the type of marriage that was solemnised) of a person 
who has more than one marriage partner". At least such a view includes homo-
sexual relationships and makes provision for those feminists who are of the 
opinion that women should also have the right to be married to more than one 
husband! 
(3) Unlawfulness 
A third requirement that must be present before conduct will be regarded as 
criminal, is the aspect of unlawfulness. The mere fact that an act corresponds 
with the prohibition in the definition of the crime, does not necessarily ~ean 
that such conduct is also unlawful. Consider for example the case where a 
speed limit of 120 kilometres per hour is set. An emergency occurs and the 
accused, having no other alternative, exceeds the speed limit to take an ill per-
son to hospital for emergency treatment. Our inherent feeling of what is, just 
and acceptable clearly implies that such conduct should not be regarded as 
criminal and punishable. Unlawfulness therefore relates to society's views and 
convictions of what is legally acceptable and right. The moment there is a valid 
reason for a person to transgress a legal rule, the views of society are that such 
a person must be excused from liability. Over the years certain of these "rea-
sons" have occurred time and again. They are now so well-defined that people 
tend to regard them as a predetermined number (numerus clausus). The pres-
ence of such a "reason" automatically excuses a person from liability for con-
duct which would otherwise be regarded as criminal. Examples of such reasons 
are acting in self-defence, cases of necessity, where consent was given, where 
somebody acts on the order of a superior, or has a right to chastise his/her 
children. These "reasons" cancel the unlawfulness of a person's conduct and are 
known in legal terminology as grounds for justification. 
(4) Blameworthiness 
The mere fact that a person's act corresponds with the prohibition stated in a 
particular definition and is at the same time unlawful, does not necessarily 
mean that the wrongdoer is without further ado criminally liable. To be guilty 
of the commission of the crime, the wrongdoer must also be to blame or, as it is 
termed in law, "fault" must be present. In its technical legal meaning "fault" 
relates to the blameworthy state of mind of a person who commits an unlawful 
act. According to Snyman (19953: 28) "the focus shifts from the act to the actor, 
that is, X himself - his personal abilities, knowledge, or lack thereof'. In terms 
of the law an offender can be held responsible for his conduct only if it is rea-
sonable to expect him/her to avoid, renounce or stop committing the unlawful 
act. A mentally ill person or a five year old child who acts unlawfully, cannot 
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Blameworthiness is therefore dependent on a person's accountability (i.e. 
his/her mental abilities or state of mind which enables him/her to distinguish 
between right and wrong and to act accordingly) and his/her attitude (that is 
whether he/she has acted intentionally or negligently). 
Only conduct where all four above-mentioned elements are present can be 
regarded as criminal and falls within the ambit of criminal law. The question 
that now arises, is whether the compiler of a dictionary should, when defining 
a crime, mention all four elements in each definition. Can one limit the defini-
tion by merely stating the prohibited form of conduct and assume that the 
reader will automatically accept that the conduct has to be unlawful and 
blameworthy as well as prohibited in a specific well-defined legal prohibition? 
Should one mention the source where the prohibition can be found? As will be 
indicated later, the legal implications of this decision can be far-reaching. 
To answer the questions stated above, it was necessary to decide for which 
target group the Centre's proposed dictionary would be appropriate. 
2.2 Determining a Target Group 
The moment we started working on the dictionary, it became evident that there 
was one important aspect which had been overlooked - there were at that 
stage only a few legal dictionaries available in South Africa that could be used 
as basic sources. For the purposes of our work, however, all had serious short-
comings. When talking about legal dictionaries, every lawyer will immediately 
mention the Trilingual Legal Dictionary by V.G. Hiemstra and HL. Gonin. The 
name of this work is, however, a complete misnomer. It is not trilingual in the 
sense that each term provided is translated into three different languages. This 
work actually consists of three sections, each of which is bilingual. The various 
sections are English-Afrikaans, Afrikaans-English and then a selection of Latin 
terms and phrases which are translated into Afrikaans and English. Definitions 
are only provided in a few selected cases where terms might be problematic. 
The Jurisdiese WoordeboeklJuridical Dictionary of c.A. Marais consists of a 
list of English legal terms translated into Afrikaans, and vice versa,without any 
explanations or definitions. The majority of terms provided are already incor-
porated in Hiemstra and Gonin's work so that this work cannot really serve as 
a separate primary source. 
A Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases by R.D. Claassen is also available. It 
is, however, not appropriate for the work of the Centre as it does not provide a 
broad or general definition of each legal term but merely indicates where refer-
ence was made to the specific term in legislation or where it was considered in 
court decisions. 
The Woordeboek van Regs- en Handelsterme by J. Smuts and I.J. Smuts is an 
Afrikaans-English legal dictionary which also provides definitions for the ma-










































62 Marthie Jansen 
- this time due to the fact that the source language is Afrikaans (which is not 
understood by many of the inhabitants of the country) and the domain limited 
to legal tenns used in commerce. 
Other South African legal dictionaries are outdated - all of them date 
back to the fifties and early sixties - and none of them cover the same field or 
follow the same approach that we had in mind. At this stage of our work it 
became evident that an enonnous need existed for the type of work the Centre 
planned. Originally the target group that had been identified as prospective 
users of the dictionary, was limited to interprefers and translators. We became 
sure that, due to the lack of sources, this target group would in all probability 
be far greater than envisaged. A dictionary such as the one we had in mind, 
would be suitable not only in the courts, but also for use by legal practitioners, 
compilers of legislation, law students and, last but not least, the man !n the 
street. 
Identifying such a broad target group immediately had an impact on our 
modus operandi. When a legal dictionary is aimed at lawyers only, a definition 
of a crime, for example, need not contain each element as explained above, but 
can be limited to the definition of the proscription alone. The definition of the 
proscription represents only one component of the total definition of the crime. 
It can be expressed negatively as the definition of the crime minus the require-
ments of unlawfulness and fault. In the case of statutory crimes the require-
ment of unlawfulness is very seldom explicitly stated in the definition although 
it is nevertheless still an implied requirement. The blameworthiness and the 
form it may take, is in the case of statutory crimes often stated indirectly by 
means of synonyms or explanatory sentences such as the use of the word 
"knowingly" which would imply intention. A lawyer is also interested in 
knowing where to find the definition of a statutory crime for example in Act... 
of 19 ... section ... Additional infonnation as to how the definition has been 
applied in practice and interpreted by the courts would also be useful. (This is 
the information supplied by Claassen (199i).) Such infonnation would be 
wasted on the layperson who is only concerned in determining what fonn of 
conduct comprises the crime. For example, the definition of theft given earlier 
is so technical and complicated that although it contains all possible elements a 
lawyer needs to know, it merely confuses the layperson and cannot be under-
stood unless extensive further explanations are given. 
Our only solution was to compromise. We therefore tried to simplify defi-
nitions in order to make them more understandable to the layperson but with-
out sacrificing aspects which might also be important to a student of law. In the 
case of statutory crimes we decided to refrain from mentioning where in a stat-
ute a specific definition can be found. The reason for this approach is because 
statutes are often amended and referential information relating to statutes eas-
ily becomes outdated. Here we also decided to restrict the definition to the pro-
scription as given in the relevant statute, but stated in a more simplified form. 










































Lost in the Labyrinth of Lexicography - Labours of a Lawyer 63 
crime are generally mentioned in the definition, especially the type of fault 
required, as this may differ (being either intention, negligence or faultless 
liability). 
2.3 Availability of Source Material 
The scarcity of South African legal dictionaries had a further impact on the 
work of the Centre. Although English is an international language and ex--
plana tory English dictionaries are freely available, this provided yet another 
drawback. Each English legal dictionary on the market reflects the legal system 
of its country of origin. British English dictionaries give the meanings of terms 
in England. Canadian English refers to Canadian law, American dictionaries 
give the meanings of legal terms in the United States, Australian dictionaries 
the Australian law system, and so forth. Although there is a correlation in the 
basic principles that apply in most of the legal systems in the Western world, 
details can differ considerably. The two major legal systems found in the West 
are the Common Law system applied in the Anglo-American countries and the 
Civil Law or Romano-Germanic system which was formed in continental 
Europe and to which South Africa belongs (David and Brierley 19782: 33). The 
latter system has Roman law as its origin. In the case of South Africa the Ro-
man law has furthermore been adapted and supplemented by Dutch law and 
English law to provide a unique South African law. Due to this uniqueness, 
definitions of terms used in other English-speaking countries do not necessarily 
correspond to those that apply in South Africa. 
To return once again to the example given earlier of the well-known term 
"crime". The technical meaning of this term as it is generally used in South 
Africa, consisting of its four basic components, has already been given. Apart 
from the term "crime" one comes across a number of related terms such as 
"offence", "misdemeanour", "felony", "contravention", and "transgression". The 
question that now arises, is whether these related terms are precise synonyms 
of "crime" or whether there are shades of differences, and if so, how the terms 
should be distinguished. Various possibilities come to mind: the terms may all 
relate to "crimes" merely indicating various levels or degrees of seriousness; 
alternatively they may draw a distinction between different types of crimes on 
the ground of origin or development thus differentiating between criminal 
conduct which is of statutory origin and conduct prohibited in terms of cus-
tomary common law. Students of law who are not aware of the basic differ-
ences between various legal systems which all use English as the language of 
communication, might fall into the trap of regarding a definition given in a 
British dictionary as being the same as the one used in South African law. 
Because the target group which the Centre had in mind for its magnum opus 
was so diverse, it was often necessary to refer to such finer distinctions. Some-
times we had to resort to extensive explanations, as the following quote from 










































64 Marthie Jansen 
crimes were until 1967 divided into three categories, namely 'treasons', 'felo-
nies' and 'misdemeanours'. 'Treasons' were more serious crimes than 'felonies', 
and 'felonies' more serious than 'misdemeanours'. This distinction used to be of 
importance in English law from a procedural point of view, and from the point 
of view of punishment, since lighter punishment was prescribed for 'misde-
meanours' than for 'felonies', and for 'felonies' than for 'treason'. In 1967 this 
distinction was abolished in England by legislation but in the USA it still 
exists." 
Other terms were not so easy to handle. The terms "crime" and "offence" 
for example are used by lawyers in an haphazard way, sometimes indiscrimi-
nately, other times intuitively in the correct context. When confronted,lawyers 
cannot give adequate reasons why one term was preferred to the other. The 
layman in this instance often thinks that "crime" refers to the more s'erious 
forms of criminal conduct such as murder, rape or theft whereas "offence" 
refers to less serious forms of criminal conduct such as the contraventions of 
municipal bylaws. Yet Snyman (19953: 7) is of the opinion that there is no tech-
nical difference between a crime and an offence. However, it seems as if the 
practising lawyer tends to use the term "crime" for conduct considered as 
criminal in terms of the common law, whereas "offence" is used more generally 
to relate to statutory prohibitions. The reason for this differentiation can per-
haps be sought in the fact that the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 - which 
lays down the procedures for the prosecution of crimes - uses the word 
"offence" throughout and defines it as "an act or omission punishable by law" 
(s 1). 
A similar situation arises in respect of words such as "litigation", "action", 
"case" and "dispute". The compiler of the English/ Afrikaans terminology lists 
has to be on the alert. A term which is not characteristic of the South African 
legal system, can easily slip through. This is even more so because, as was 
already mentioned, there are no criminal law dictionaries with definitions 
based on South African law available in the country. Nonlegal dictionaries 
seldom provide the finer nuances of meaning necessary to distinguish between 
synonyms or near synonyms. Ample use has therefore to be made of South 
African legal textbooks and this delays the work considerably. Where terms are 
particularly difficult to define, help is obtained from academics involved in 
the teaching of law. However, simplifying a definition without omitting some 
of its salient features remains extremely difficult. 
Merely omitting those legal terms which are not applied in South Africa, is 
not always regarded as the best solution. The development of the world into a 
"global village", the development of communication technology and the avail-
ability of English and American films, videos and other forms of communica-
tion in the South African market has had the effect that certain legal terms 
which are strictly speaking not at all South African, have become part and par-
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-
dictionary, and to explain their meanings while indicating why they are not 
regarded as South African and what the correct South African equivalent is. 
The term "jury" for example, crops up so often that the average South African is 
under the impression that a jury system exists in this country although it was 
abolished in 1969. (By "jury" is meant, according to Coertze and Hiemstra 
(1947: 81), nine lay persons, drawn by lot, who sit in criminal cases as judges of 
fact, not of law.) 
In English law a barrister is "a specialist consultant and pleader belonging 
to a class of lawyers that is given predominant rights of audience in superior 
courts" (Gamer 19952: 99.) To rephrase, a barrister is an advocate admitted to 
the bar who might appear in court on behalf of suitors or defendants. He is 
distinguished from the attorney who draws the pleadings, prepares the testi-
mony and conducts matters out of court. In the United States the term has no 
official meaning but is a popular synonym for "lawyer". In South Africa the 
acceptable term is "advocate". 
Another term that is often heard in South African conversations is, "first 
degree murder". It has its origin in American jurisdictions where a differentia-
tion is made between first degree and second degree murder on the basis and 
gravity of the offence (Gamer 19952: 259). In the case of the former the inten-
tional killing is "premeditated" whereas in the latter case the intentional killing 
occurs without "premeditation" (Handler 1994: 351). For a South African, the 
concept of "premeditation" is incorporated in the element of intention because 
the latter refers to the idea of having knowledge of the unlawfulness of one's 
conduct but nevertheless directing one's will towards attaining a desired result 
(Snyman 19953: 168). 
In other instances identical terms are used in different legal systems but 
the meanings do not always correspond. The term "battery" would perhaps be 
a good example to use. In English law this term relates to "the unlawful beating 
or wounding of a person or mere touching in a hostile or offensive manner" 
(Hanks 19892: 130). In South Africa "battery" has a more limited meaning and 
relates to a type of assault that is committed persistently and intermittently, 
usually by a relative of the victim or by a person living in the same house. In 
this country, however, there is no crime of battery. The type of conduct men-
tioned in relation to this term is punished as assault Gansen 1993: 202). 
Due to the various problems mentioned here, the compilers of the source-
language terminology list quite often found it easier to work with the Afri-
kaans equivalent of a term instead of the English original. In this way they 
were less likely to confuse the meanings applied in different countries. This is 
why the Afrikaans terminology had to be compiled simultaneously with the 
English. It could not be added later as a mere translation of the English. For-
mulating a definition in Afrikaans at least had the advantage that the end 










































66 Marthie Jansen 
2.4 English-Afrikaans Translation 
However, the approach mentioned above had a serious disadvantage which 
caused a further stumbling block. Terms in one language do not always have 
precise equivalents in another language. The term in the source language is 
frequently broader or narrower in meaning than the term in the target lan-
guage into which it is translated. This problem arose quite often as the Centre's 
dictionary is not limited to terms which occur only in the field of criminal law 
and criminal procedural law. There are also a number of what one can call "pe-
ripheral" terms. Such terms are generally used in a nonlegal sense but they also 
occur so often in the fields of criminal and criminal procedural law that they 
can just as well be classified as criminal law terms. These terms quite often 
have various meanings: some of them strictly related to criminal law, others of 
a more general nature. In the translation process from English to Afrikaans one 
finds that for each meaning attached to the English term a separate term might 
exist in the Afrikaans. To make things even more complicated the same might 
apply to the Afrikaans side. The Afrikaans translation of a term might therefore 
have additional meanings which are not incorporated in the English equivalent. 
In a normal dictionary where terms in one language are merely translated into 
another language, this phenomenon is not really problematic. However, the 
moment when a definition is also given for a term in the source language and 
the definition has to be translated and has to reflect the same meaning in the 
target language as well, problems are sure to arise. It was therefore inevitable 
that the definitions in source and target languages could not always be precise 
mirror images of one another. (The aspect mentioned in this paragraph had 
further consequences when it came to the writing of an appropriate computer 
program. It was the Centre's intention to create a database where a target lan-
guage could be changed into a source language and vice versa and the com-
pilators had to take this into account.) 
An example might explain the situation better: 
In the legal sense the term "enrol" normally has three distinct meanings 
depending on whether it is used with regard to a thing, a person or a lawyer. 
(It is interesting that a lawyer is regarded as neither a thing nor a person!) In 
the first instance "enrol" has the meaning of "to put on record" or "to record or 
note in a roll or list". In the second sense it means "to become or cause to 
become a member, to enlist or register" in other words the physical act of writ-
ing a person's name in a list or register (Hanks 19892: 508). Where the term is 
used with relation to an attorney or advocate, it has the meaning of admitting 
them to the bar or side-bar. In Afrikaans the corresponding terms are "ter rolle 
plaas" when used in relation to a thing, "inskryf" or "wed" where it relates to 
placing a person's name on a register, and "toelaat" in terms of advocates and 
attorneys. All the Afrikaans terms can be used in other senses which differ 
from the ones in which they are used here. To mention just a few: the term 
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-
ernUt someone to do something. In this specific example the solution was 
~uite easy: the additional meanings were merely omitted because they did not 
relate to criminal law. However, similar cases were not so easy to handle. 
During this stage of the work, interesting aspects regarding language and 
the origin of words and terms also came to light. In English the word "govern-
ment" is used to indicate the existing ruling party as well as the state itself 
(Hanks 19892: 659). Afrikaans on the other hand distinguishes between the two 
concepts. In Afrikaans the distinction is confirmed by the fact that the Govern-
ment Gazette and a Government Notice are called "Staatskoerant" and "Goe-
wermentskennisgewing" respectively. Why separate terms for a concept which 
seems the same? No existing dictionary could help and we had to refer to the 
original Dutch (Beets and Muller 1900: 494). It appears that the difference 
comes from the fact that the word "staat" is considered a neutral term without 
emotional value, whereas "goewerment" is politically coloured. (In the first 
indigenous language into which the terms were translated the differentiation 
found in the Afrikaans was maintained rather than the similarity existing in the 
English. From the Sepedi word "busa" which means "to govern", two nouns 
were derived, namely "puso" for government and "mmuso" for state.) 
3. Legal Problems 
What has been said so far relates only to those problems which had direct 
bearing on terminology, lexicography and language. In the indirect sense there 
were other, possibly more important issues (from a lawyer's point of view) that 
also had to be taken into consideration. I call them indirect issues because they 
are strictly speaking not related to the work as such but are important prereq-
uisites which must be kept in mind because they give rise to various legal con-
sequences. In what follows, two of these side issues are considered namely the 
obligations flowing from copyright laws and the liabilities incurred by the 
creation of a new product. 
3.1 Copyright Issues 
A detailed exposition of the copyright requirements applicable to terminolo-
gists and lexicographers was given by Jooste and Alberts (1998: 123) in an arti-
cle in the previous edition of Lexikos. The writers referred to "lexicographers 
and terminographers as being both creators of copyrightable products, and 
users of copyrighted products". As these two aspects go to the heart of copy-
right protection, I will refer briefly to both in so far as they are applicable when 
compiling the type of dictionary the Centre has in mind. 
The law governing copyright in South Africa is regulated by the Copy-
, right Act 98 of 1978 as amended. (This Act is based on an international agree-










































68 Marthie Jansen 
international agreement that is the primary source for determining the legal 
principles that apply in this country.) Apart from the Act there are a number of 
court decisions which interpret various portions of the Act and provide prece-
dents which can be relied on when copyright issues arise. The law governing 
copyright is extremely complex. I shall therefore attempt to explain some of the 
problems encountered in this regard by the Centre in layman's language and 
refrain from using the normal legalese used by lawyers. 
The basic principle that applies in the case of copyright, is that a person 
who creates, something has a right of ownership over the article that he/she 
has created. In other words, the owner obtains a qualified monopoly over 
his/her creation which enables him/her to prevent the unsolicited copying of 
the work (Copeling 1978: 3). Although the idea of copyright protection is not to 
make the owner of the copyright rich, he/she obtains the financial benefit that 
results from his/her work (Dean 1998: 1-1). The various categories of works 
protected under the copyright laws include literary works. Strictly speaking it 
is better to refer to these as written works because the literary merit of the work 
is irrelevant (Dean 1998: 1-6; also see University of London Press Ltd v University 
Tutorial Press Ltd 1916 2 Ch 601 608). Books, articles, encyclopaedias and dic-
tionaries are all regarded as written (or literary) works (s 1(1) of the Copyright 
Act 98 of 1978 as amended) and are protected under the Act. This aspect is 
important to the compiler of a new dictionary as these are the sources normally 
consulted when compiling the new work. 
3.1.1 The use of existing sources during the compilation of a new dictionary 
As stated above, copyright gives the copyright owner of a work the sole right 
to exploit his/her work commercially for a certain period. It is as if the owner 
obtains a bundle (Dean 1998: 1-81) of exclusive, overlapping rights. Actions by 
outsiders which diminish these rights, are regarded as infringements. Broadly 
speaking, one can say that infringement of another's copyright takes place 
when there is unauthorised copying or unauthorised commercial exploitation 
of a work (Dean 1998: 1-37). Although it is not stated as such in the Act, 
infringement can only occur when there has been actual copying of a substan-
tial portion of another's work (Cope ling 1978: 24, 25) without the copyright 
holder's permission. The prohibition seems simple and straightforward enough 
but it leaves the door open for diverse interpretations. 
The first question that arises, is what is meant by actual copying. It is easy 
to determine that an identical copy is a case of actual copying, for example a 
photostat copy of a printed book. However, the issue becomes clouded when 
the format of the original is changed to some degree so that the copy is not a 
precise replica of the original. Generally speaking, lawsuits involve situations 
where protected material has either been used commercially or altered; Where 
a work is transformed in such a manner that the original or substantial features 
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adaptation depending on how the original was transformed. Both "reproducing 
the work in any manner or form", and "making an adaptation of the work" are 
regarded as comprising actual copying and therefore constitute infringement (s 
6 of the Copyright Act). For our purposes it is important to note that the trans-
lation of a literary work is specifically mentioned in the Copyright Act as being 
a form of adaptation (s 1(1)). 
Secondly, even where actual copying does take place, the copying must 
have been of a substantial portion of the work and not of isolated passages or 
phrases. The term "substantial" is interpreted as relating to both quantity and 
quality, although the latter is regarded as being of greater importance than the 
former (Dean 1998: 1-37). A substantial portion in relation to a literary work 
can therefore refer to a small but extremely important part of it (for example a 
summary or conclusion). "As long as what is taken has substance in the original 
work (and is not de minimis) or has sufficient pith to constitute the embodiment 
of original intellectual activity in a material form, for instance a paragraph in a 
book or perhaps even a sentence or sequence of sentences, copyright infringe-
ment could arise", according to Dean (1998: 1-38). "The criterion is what has 
been taken from the plaintiff's work and not what portion the infringing mate-
rial makes up qualitatively of the contentious work." This was the approach fol-
lowed by our Appellate Court in Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovic CC & others 
1995 (4) SA 441 (A) where the reproduction of individual part numbers from a 
catalogue of spare parts was regarded as a substantial part from the catalogue. 
"As a general rule, if there is only one way to state something, it is not 
copyrightable", Zelezny (1993: 289) however stresses. "For example, the scien-
tific equation E = mc2 could not have been copyrighted by Albert Einstein". 
The Copyright Act makes special provision for specific circumstances 
where one may not be liable for infringement when using another's work with-
out his/her permission. These exemptions are allowed because it is considered 
to be in the public interest that the exclusivity of the copyright owner's rights 
are limited in certain circumstances (Dean 1998: 1-51). For purposes of the work 
done by the Centre for Legal Terminology in African Languages the most 
important of these so-called "statutory defences" are those relating to research 
(s 12(1)), quotation (s 12(3)) or "by way of illustration ... for teaching" (s 12(4)). 
Apart from these defences the Act also makes provision for a general exemp-
tion in section 13 in terms of which "reproduction of a work shall also be per-
mitted as prescribed by regulation, but in such a manner that the reproduction 
is not in conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and is not unreasona-
bly prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright". This 
means that the regulations issued in terms of the Act must also be consulted to 
obtain more precise guidelines. When read with the exemptions mentioned in 
sections 12 and 13, the regulations clearly indicate that use made of another's 
work must always be reasonable and the source and author's name should be 










































70 Marthie Jansen 
In the Act reasonableness is equated with fair dealing or fair practice. 
Although this concept is very vague and subjective and therefore difficult to 
define, it clearly relates to questions of degree or extent. In the case of quota-
tions, for example, it means that one has to take into consideration such aspects 
as the number and extent of the quotations (in other words, how much of the 
text consists of quotation), the use made of the quotations (whether they are 
used as a basis for comment, criticism or review or to convey mere informa-
tion), or their proportion to the text in which they are inserted (long extracts 
with short comments in contrast to short extracts with long comments). 
One can argue that the principles set out above are not a stumbling block 
if, as mentioned earlier, the Centre uses mostly foreign dictionaries for the 
compilation of its work. However, the copyright of works created in other 
countries is also protected in South Africa in terms of various international 
treaties which were incorporated into South African law (by section 37 of the 
Copyright Act after notice in the Gazette). The oldest and most elaborate treaty 
in the field of copyright is the one known as the Berne Convention. It had its 
origin in 1886 in Switzerland and has since been refined and brought up to date 
by subsequent conventions, the last of which was held in Paris in 1971. The 
basis of the Berne Convention is that each country that has signed it, under-
takes to enforce the copyright of works created or published in any of the other 
signatory countries as if those works originated in the home country of the 
signatory (Dean 1998: 88). At present more than 80 countries, including South 
Africa, have ratified the Berne Convention. In practice this means that works 
originating within any signatory country are protected in South Africa as if 
those works were South African. 
The above is merely an overview of the most basic principles relating to 
infringement of copyright. When applied to the compilation of the Centre's 
dictionary, this overview implies: 
(1) Selecting single terms from a source work and using these in a target 
work does not normally amount to an infringement of copyright. This 
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that in the case of works com-
prising common information which is in the public domain, it is not the 
information that is the subject of protection but the formulation and 
form of the work (Dean 1998: 1-42). Trittipo (1996: 369 as quoted in 
Jooste and Alberts 1998: 129) takes the argument further by stating that if 
the "idea" (in other words the information) and its "expression" (that is 
the formulation of the idea in words or phrases) are inseparable, copying 
the expression will not be barred, since protecting the "expression" in 
such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the "idea" upon the 
copyright owner. Individual words or terms in general language are the 
common property of all speakers, since the idea cannot be separated 
from the way it is expressed in a single word Gooste and Alberts 1998: 
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than in the terms per se. The moment a new selection of terms is made, 
the original work is normally altered to such an extent that the new work 
cannot be regarded as a copy of the original. As stated in Waylite Diaries 
CC v First National Bank Ltd 1993 (2) SA 128 133B, "there is a distinction 
between copying (which negatives originality), and the use by an author 
of already existing material or of knowledge common to himself and 
others (which does not)". Where a legal dictionary contains all legal 
terms in a specific language, the selection of only those terms relating to 
criminal law or criminal procedural law cannot be regarded as actual 
copying of the original. However, to be certain that this is not the case, 
one can add further terms not mentioned in the original work. 
(2) If definitions are added to the selected terms, it takes the target work 
even further from the original source work which was used as basis, but 
at the same time this conduct leads to new problems. The question then 
arises of whether a definition that is copied from an existing copyright 
protected work (South African or otherwise), could, in the light of what 
has been said above, make the copier liable for infringement of copy-
right. 
Definitions that are structured in such a way that they are compre-
hensive and precise, are identical to Zelezny's example of the mathe-
matical formula quoted earlier. In the legal field the definitions of most 
well-known common-law crimes probably fall within this group. For 
example, defining murder as "the unlawful and intentional causing of 
the death of another human being" (Snyman 19953 : 401) is virtually unal-
terable. One can safely assume that the copying of such a definition does 
not violate the rights existing in the source. 
Unfortunately all definitions are not so easy. Where a definition in a 
source work is set out clearly and cannot easily be improved on, 
although it is not the only way in which the wording can be formulated, 
it can only be copied with impunity if one or more of the defences can be 
relied upon. The most probable defence would be the one relating to 
quotations. In such a case however, the proviso mentioned in section 
12(3) must be fulfilled, namely "that the quotation shall be compatible 
with fair practice, that the extent thereof shall not exceed the extent justi-
fied by the purpose and that the source shall be mentioned, as well as 
the name of the author if it appears on the work". Fair practice is not 
necessarily applicable only to a work as a whole. Where a sentence or 
phrase is so unique that it is directly linked to the creator thereof, repeti-
tion thereof without mentioning the source and indicating that it is a 
quotation, is regarded as infringement. As it is neither customary nor 
financially justifiable to quote each source immediately after a specific 
definition has been given, one should in these cases try to rephrase such 










































72 Marthie Jansen 
(3) In the case of statutory crimes, defining the crime does not lead to the 
copyright issues explained above. In terms of section 12(8)(a) of the 
Copyright Act, government-created works can be freely quoted because 
"no copyright shall subsist in official texts of a legislative, administrative 
or legal nature, or in official translations of such texts". 
3.1.2 Obtaining copyright in the new creation 
The second copyright issue with which the Centre had to deal was whether the 
new dictionary would enjoy copyright even though it consisted of extracts 
from various other sources and might infringe the copyright of those works. In 
this regard section 2(3) of the Act expressly states that "a work shall not be 
ineligible for copyright by reason only that the making of the work ... involved 
an infringement of copyright in some other work". As already said a dictionary 
falls under one of the categories mentioned as protected works in the Act and 
therefore has the inherent possibility of being protectable. The actual protection 
depends on whether the other basic requirements have been met. Where this 
has occurred, there are no further formalities to obtain copyright protection as 
we do not have a system of registration or recording of copyright in this coun-
try (Dean 1998: I-IS). 
Briefly stated, the various basic requirements are the following: 
(1) Material form 
The Act specifically states that the work must exist in writing or some other 
material form (s 2(2)). A work cannot enjoy copyright protection before it is 
fixed in a tangible medium. The creator's particular way of expressing him-
self/herself is protected, and not his/her raw ideas. The material form in which 
a work must appear before it enjoys protection, will obviously vary depending 
on the category of work concerned. It is however not necessary that the mate-
rial form should express a meaning in language. In the case of a work such as a 
new dictionary, the "material form" would probably be writing, a tape record-
ing, a computer disk or microchip. It makes no difference where these "material 
forms" are in themselves meaningless, and can only be read when used in con-
junction with a specific machine such as a computer. 
(2) Originality 
A work must be original before it can enjoy protection (s 2(1) of the Act). Sim-
ply stated, originality means that the author must have created the work - it 
should not merely be a reproduction of existing material. The work does not 
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efforts and must not be copied from some other source (Dean 1998: 1-15; also 
see Kalamazoo Division (Pty> Ltd v Gay 1978 (2) SA 184 (C». Originality must 
therefore be viewed as the execution of original skill or labour, and not as 
original thought or expression of thought (Klep Valves (Pty> Ltd v Saunders, Valve 
Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A) as confirmed in Appleton & another v Harnischfeger Cor-
poration & another 1995 (2) SA 247 (A». 
Works may however contain some components which are not original. In 
such a case the original creative effort is used on material that already exists. 
"The individual bits of information contained in such works are not original 
creations of the compilation author, and taken individually they may not even 
be copyrightable", according to Zelezny (1993: 291). "Yet the compilation as a 
whole is 'an original, copyrightable work if the information is selected, 
arranged, and presented through independent effort and with 'a modicum of 
creativity', to use the judicial phrase." He then mentions an American court 
decision of 1991 where a directory containing the names of public relations 
firms, their addresses and a list of their employees, was declared a copy-
rightable compilation. In this case the creative effort lay in the soliciting of the 
listings and determining which firms qualified for inclusion. 
In the case of a collection or compilation, individual pieces of information 
from works that are already in existence, are collected and put together. They 
are first selected, arranged and then through independent effort and with a 
degree of creativity presented in a way that gives rise to a new work with its 
own copyright. The individual contributions may be protected by their own 
separate copyrights. The copyright of the author of the collection is limited to 
the collection he has put together (the new compilation). He does not suddenly 
obtain copyright in someone else's work - in the contributions he has col-
lected. 
This aspect of originality was summarised by Lord Atkinson in the Eng-
lish case of MacMillan & Co v Cooper 1923 LR 51 Ind App 109 (as quoted by 
Copeling 1978: 15): "To secure copyright for the product it is necessary that 
labour, skill and capital should be expended sufficiently to impart to the prod-
uct some quality or character which the raw material did not possess, and 
which differentiates the product from the raw material." Similar views were 
expressed in South African court cases (see for example Waylite Diaries CC v 
First National Bank Ltd 1993 (2) SA 128). 
(3) Propriety 
For the sake of completeness this requirement is mentioned here, although it 
does not play a role in the compilation of a dictionary. It is not really a 
requirement that has to be met but our courts have consistently held that copy-
right protection will not be given to a work which is improper, defamatory, 
immoral, blasphemous or obscene. Propriety is therefore not so much a condi-










































74 Marthie Jansen 
copyright (Dean 1998: 1-18; also see Goeie Hoop Uitgewers (Edms) (Bpk) v Central 
News Agency & another 1953 (2) SA 843 (W)). 
(4) Publication or qualified person 
The final requirement that has to be met is that the first publication of the new 
work should take place within South Africa (s 4 of the Copyright Act) or alter-
natively, where there is no publication, the author (or in the case of joint 
authorship, one of the authors) should be a qualified person at the time the 
work is made (s 3). When one is dealing with an individual, a qualified person 
means a person who is a South African citizen or is domiciled or resident in the 
Republic. In the case of a juristic person, a qualified person is a body (institu-
tion) incorporated under the laws of the Republic (s 3(1)). 
The practical implication of all these requirements is that works are protected 
before publication while they are still in the process of being created. Those bits 
and pieces of the Centre's creation that have already been completed (and 
which fulfil the other requirements of a material form and originality), there-
fore enjoy copyright protection even though the work as such is not yet ready 
for publication. 
3.1.3 Who owns the copyright in the Centre's dictionary? 
Where several people are involved in a creation process, it can sometimes be 
quite problematic to determine who actually created the work. In the case of 
joint works prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their con-
tributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole, the authors are co-owners of the copyright and share in its profits (Dean 
1998: 1-24). Although guidelines exist in this regard and the Act makes special 
provision for situations where work is done in the course of employment or on 
consignment, the issue is not always clear. As the provisions of the Act in this 
regard (s 21) can be altered by written agreement it is therefore recommended 
that in the case of organisations such as the Centre, this be done in advance in 
order to avoid disputes and uncertainty over copyright ownership later on. 
Although copyright in a new work cannot be registered or approved by a 
government agency, a copyright notice should be placed on works which are 
distributed to the public. Such a notice indicates that copyright exists in the 
work so that a would-be infringer is deterred from copying the work as he/she 
cannot state as a defence that he/she was not aware of the subsistence of copy-
right in the work (a statutory defence provided in s 24(2) of the Act against a 
claim for damages}. Where a copyright notice is used, it is recommended that it 
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the word "copyright" or the international symbol @, 
the year of first publication, and 
the name of the copyright owner. 
This form of marking is the one prescribed by the Universal Copyright Con-
vention. Although South Africa is not a member of the convention, this has 
become the acceptable form of marking in most countries (Dean 1998 : 5-21 in 
88). 
3.1.4 Copyright on the Internet 
The whole issue of copyright is likely to grow even more complicated as elec-
tronic manipulation extends. At this stage the Centre has not yet considered 
making completed definitions available on Internet, so this aspect will not be 
discussed here. I would however like to refer to a remark by the Internet expert 
Negroponte (1995: 58): "Copyright law is totally out of date. It is a Gutenberg 
artefact. Since it is a reactive process, it will probably have to break down com-
pletely before it is corrected." This might be an overstatement of the case but it 
can lead to controversy. On the one hand, some people are of the opinion that 
the law should not limit the free flow of information on the Internet. On the 
other hand, most authors and publishers are notably reluctant to make full 
works available on the Internet as this can affect their prospective income. The 
future here is still nebulous. 
3.2 Product Liability 
From a lawyer's perspective there is one further aspect which should be kept in 
mind, namely the basic principle that anyone who, through his conduct, causes 
harm to another in a situation where the conduct is wrongful and blamewor-
thy, should compensate the injured person for the damage suffered. (As stated 
in Neethling et al. 1994: 4 these are the general requirements for any delictual 
claim.) The basic explanations that were given above with regard to criminal 
conduct and blameworthiness, apply here as well. Wrongfulness in this case is 
similar to the unlawfulness that was given as an element of a crime, thus relat-
ing to conduct that would be regarded as unacceptable by the community 
because no valid reason exists which could be regarded as excuse for the con-
duct (Neethling et al. 1994: 31 read with 37 and 67). The development of 
industries and technology has led to an extension of this basic principle and 
given rise to what is nowadays called "product liability". 
In principle "product liability" means that a manufacturer of a product is 
liable for harm or damage that might flow from the use of his product if the 
conduct of the manufacturer during the process of manufacturing can be 










































76 Marthie Jansen 
of Anglo-American law this liability has developed even further and the 
requirement of blameworthiness has been diluted by a specific application of 
the doctrine that facts should speak for themselves. The mere fact that a manu-
facturer has placed a faulty product on the market then gives rise to certain 
presumptions, namely that he used an unsuitable production process or that 
his employees exercised his production process negligently. In this way the 
basic principle that fault (blameworthiness) should be a requirement for liabil-
ity is undermined and a disguised no-fault liability arises (Neethling et al. 1994: 
307 fn 279). Although such a general "product liability without fault" is not 
frequently encountered in South Africa, it is propagated by various eminent 
jurists (see in this regard Neethling et al. 1994 : 308 and the references given 
there). To date, a consumer who wishes to institute a claim against a 
manufacturer must prove that the conduct of the manufacturer was blame- ' 
worthy and wrongful and has as a result caused damage to the consumer. 
So far our courts have not yet decided a case of a claim instituted by the 
user of a dictionary for damage flowing from such use. Taking into regard, 
however, the unique nature of the dictionary the Centre has in mind, and the 
prospective target group, it is possible that such a dictionary might give rise to 
delictual claims based on "product liability". I would therefore like to conclude 
by referring to a few hypothetical scenarios. 
Assume for a moment the dictionary envisaged by the Centre is com-
pleted and published. The effect would be that there is an authoritative work 
available in the domain of criminal law and criminal procedural law giving all 
the terms encountered in these fields and explaining what each means. As the 
compilers of the dictionary have acted in their professional capac;ities, they 
have tacitly undertaken to provide correct information and in theory are liable 
for any harm that might arise from use of this product. Alheit (1997: 56) distin-
guishes three types of liability that might arise from product usage, namely 
where there is a defect in the product itself, where the product is not defective 
but is used incorrectly and lastly where the product is available on the market 
but is not used at all. 
In our speculative discussion, the first two possibilities might be present. 
A definition in the Centre's dictionary might perhaps be incorrect - the prod-
uct that has been created, is then defective. Assume for a moment that X is a 
lawyer. He uses this defective definition in order to prepare for a case and due 
to the incorrect information loses his case. The defect in the product has given 
rise to the damage, therefore the compilers of the dictionary would be respon-
sible for X's losses. Improbable? But in theory not impossible. 
Have a look at the second scenario: in this case X is a female and lives 
alone in a house. One evening when entering her home, she is attacked by a 
robber whom she shoots in self-defence. X is accused of murder. She decides to 
conduct her own defence. She consults the Centre's dictionary in order to 
determine precisely what is meant by the crime of murder so that she can pre-
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causing of another person's death". X regards her conduct as unlawful because 
it is contrary to the legal norms applicable in this country. She also regards her 
conduct as being intentional because when she fired the shot she intended to 
kill the robber. She therefore pleads guilty to the charge and presents no evi-
dence on her own behalf. She is found guilty and sentenced. Incorrect use of 
the correct information in the dictionary has in this case been the cause of her 
downfall. (In practice this cannot happen in the case of a murder charge 
because even where an accused pleads guilty, the state still has to prove the 
basic elements of the crime. The example was merely chosen because of the 
brevity of this specific definition.) \ 
4. Conclusion 
The examples given above might be preposterous and over-simplified, but 
with the ever increasing use made of "do-it-yourself law", similar scenes might 
easily arise. This is not the appropriate time or place to discuss the relevant 
legal principles in more detail as these comprise a whole new field of study. 
Hopefully the dictionary we are compiling at present, will weather all storms. 
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